Reflections on the optimal size of government by Monissen, Hans G.
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Monissen, Hans G.
Working Paper
Reflections on the optimal size of
government
Würzburg economic papers, No. 12
Provided in cooperation with:
Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Suggested citation: Monissen, Hans G. (1999) : Reflections on the optimal size of government,























Lehrstuhl für Volkswirtschaftslehre, 
insbesondere allgemeine Wirtschaftspolitik 




W. E. P. 
 
Würzburg Economic Papers        Hans G. Monissen  2 
 
REFLECTIONS ON THE OPTIMAL 














0. ON GORDON TULLOCK 
 
“It is not always easy to see a common thread in Tullock’s work: he is almost too 
fertile and throws off so many ideas in all directions that the connecting links between 
them threaten to disappear from view. Any simple summary of his ‘system’, therefore, 
must wait on some future effort of his own. However, a common thread in his work, as 
in that of all public choice theorists, is the view that human behaviour must be viewed 
in all circumstances as a ‘rational’ response to the twin constraints of the physical 
environment and the prevailing social institutions; people will always strive to 
maximize their satisfactions in the face of these constraints, taking due account of the 
costs of alternative choices” (Blaug, [1985] 252-53).  
Gordon Tullock is the 1998 Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic 
Association. In the enclosed short appreciation of his work we read: “Tullock’s 
scholarship and entrepreneurship have left an indelible imprint on economics. He is a 
pioneer who has worked almost exclusively at the frontiers of the discipline” (American 
Economic Review, [1998]). 
Inspecting Gordon Tullock’s curriculum vitae which contains 37 pages compiling his 
published work will indeed confirm the assertion that his scientific work is concentrated 
at the frontiers of our discipline. However, Tullock has not only extended the domain of 
economic inquiry, but also strengthened the core of our discipline. As opposed to 
Blaug’s remark we should note that there exists a simple summary of his “system”. It 
was in 1975 when Gordon Tullock with his co-author Richard McKenzie published one 




view of the workings of the socio-economic process. In their standard model the basic 
unit of analysis used is homo oeconomicus as characterized above. The authors apply 
this role model consistently and successfully to a wide range of both market and non-
market phenomena.
 1 
The paper “Reflections on the Optimal Size of Government” should, at least 
subjectively, reflect Gordon Tullock’s influence on our perspective. However, we have 
to admit our analytical shortcomings of not being able to simultaneously include such 
Tullockian topics as rent-seeking, demand-revealing, bureaucratic behavior (to name 




Most economists in the classical liberal tradition associate with Adam Smith (1976, 
208-9) by assigning only three duties to the government: “first, the duty of protecting 
the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the 
duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of the society from the injustice or 
oppression of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact 
administration of justice; and thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public 
works and certain public institutions, which it can never be for the interest of any 
individual, or small number of individuals, to erect and maintain; because the profit 
could never repay the expense to any individual or small number of individuals, though 
it may frequently do much more than repay it to a great society.”
2 To provide the 
necessary financial funds for implementing these duties, Adam Smith’s system of 
natural liberty has to be completed by a set of fiscal rules or a fiscal constitution. Since 
the publication of the seminal book by Brennan and Buchanan The Power to Tax with 
the programmatic subtitle Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution ([1980]; see 
also Brennan and Buchanan, [1977]), the general conceptional ingredients for such a 
completion seem to be available. However, as known from the literature, applying 
operational criteria to limit government activities in a dynamic setting is not an easy 
task (see Inman, [1982 and 1987]). 
The fundamental constitutional approach by Brennan and Buchanan advocating 
several constraining principles for Leviathan remains somewhat controversial. Some 
economists subscribing to the theory of optimal taxation
3 argue that an implicit trade-off        Hans G. Monissen  4 
between overall efficiency and a smaller government sector size may be biased. 
Avoiding a general discussion of this issue, we take a more pragmatic stance and 
consider the theory of optimal taxation at least as a useful starting point describing a 
“what-could-be” position.
4 
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, a simple choice-theoretic general 
equilibrium model describing government productive activity is presented.
5 The 
government supplies a public good which becomes effective as an infrastructure 
investment enhancing the productivity of the private sector. This type of government 
productive activity should be distinguished from the Keynesian view of the typical 
macroeconomic model in which the government activity remains not only unproductive 
but also welfare reducing if potential multiplier effects of government activity on 
employment are ignored. However, a government above a critical size will bring forth 
Leviathan who might appear in two quite different roles: he might materialize as a 
selfish dictator maximizing a surplus to be appropriated for personal uses or an 
anonymous bureaucracy trying to maximize the size of the budget. In supplementing the 
standard public-choice perspective, the model could rationalize efforts of “organized 
labor” to redistribute income in the functional sense from capital to labor by fixing the 
real wage rate at too high a level for overall efficiency. These efforts may lead to an 
excessive size of government over time.  
Section 3 discusses the economic problem for a benevolent dictator under the 
perspective of the modern theory of optimal taxation. In addition to the infrastructure 
effect of the public good the model includes two private goods and a pure public good 
for our representative consumer. For this extended model the second-best tax structure 
is derived. These more technical aspects should complete the discussion in Section 2 
and 4. In particular, Section 3 allows the formal computation of the Lindahl equilibrium 
included in Table 1. 
In Section 4, relying on a numerical example, the pattern of production and 
employment under competing objectives is evaluated for a benevolent dictator. This 
“first-best” solution provides the reference situation against which other objectives such 
as maximizing aggregate consumer surplus, national product or national income 
(private production) are evaluated. Section 5 deals with the effects of a budget- or 




simple model of Section 2 summarized in equations I and the one underlying the 
discussion in Section 4 and 5 regard a basic problem from two different angles. The first 
emphasizes more the productivity aspects and the second focuses mainly on welfare 
issues. Section 6 briefly summarizes the main results. Two supplementary appendices to 
Section 2 and 3 are included at the end of the paper.  
 
2. A SIMPLE CHOICE-THEORETIC MODEL DESCRIBING 
GOVERNMENT PRODUCTIVE ACTIVITIES 
 
The point of departure is a simple choice-theoretic model incorporating a 
representative private consumer and a complementary private firm. The role of 
government derives from the fact that a public good is included. This public good 
operates as an efficiency parameter in the production function for private output but, for 
the present, remains excluded from the utility function. In Section 3, the model will be 
extended to cover such a utility effect. The wage bill of the public sector has to be 
financed by taxes. The funds will be raised by imposing a proportional income tax. In 
deriving the structure of the model, special care is necessary to demarcate the functional 
role of the representative agent. As in all market systems the private agents are 
characterized by partial ignorance which allows to treat specific prices as parameters.
6 
In socio-political models the representative agent frequently plays the dual role of a 
typical consumer in the market arena and a median voter driving the political process 
and controlling government activities.
7 It should be noted that a representative agent in a 
comprehensive sense does not need a government because he controls all resources and 
all instruments to maximize his private utility or, for that matter, the welfare of the 
economy with identical individuals. 
We postulate a simple utility function with standard properties:
8 
Uu xRy
pw  (, ) ,  u1 and u2 > 0.                                     (2.1) 
x
p denotes the output disposable for the private consumption, R identifies the total 
time endowment available for work time, y
w, and leisure, y. 
The private budget constraint is defined as follows: 
xt w yt
pw   () () 11 .                         (2.2)        Hans G. Monissen  6 
Gross wages, wy
w, plus gross profits, , minus the tax burden define the disposable 
income for the economy which is large enough to buy the whole product if the 
government abstains from engaging in transactions which reduce this consumption 











()( )    1 .                         (2.3) 
The consumer treats the real wage rate, w, and real profits, , as parameters, thereby 
ignoring the fact that both magnitudes depend on his employment decision.  
Because working hours supplied both to the private and the public sector, y
p and y
g, 
command the same real net wage rate, the allocation of the working time is, to begin 
with, indeterminate. Output produced in the private sector is not only a function of the 
employment level and the capital stock in the private sector, y
p and  K
p but also of the 
employment level in the public sector, y
g. The later variable determines a public good 
or an infrastructure component, z, which multiplies a private output component f: 
xz yfyK z yf y
gp p g p 
 ()(; ) () () , 
           z z f f 0, 0, 0, 0.                                                                         (2.4) 
The right side of the equation suppresses the term for the capital stock in the private 
sector which will be kept constant. The signs of the stated derivatives follow a priori-
reasoning where the signs of the public component could be switched to allow for a 
more pessimistic view of the economic role of government. Different from the 
procedure in Section 4, the effect of z on x is simply proportional. 
Overall efficiency requires that a marginal shift of employment between the two 
sectors should produce the same effect on the private production level: 
   zy fy z y f y
gp g p () () ()() .                         (2.5) 
How is the efficiency requirement brought about? Without evoking a benevolent 
social planner the actions of the government have to be constrained by appropriate 
budgetary rules. Sufficient rules, as will be seen in a moment, are the imposition of an 
optimal tax rate and the requirement of a balanced budget to be defined below. Before 
the attention is directed to the government budget constraint the model has to be solved 





gp   ()() ,                           (2.6) 
  zy f y w y
gp p () () .                             (2.7) 
The government uses the tax receipts for paying off the government employees and 
financing a possible extra absorption of the private output, x. This discretionary 
expenditure component will be referred to as Keynesian government expenditures, x
g. 
As in most macroeconomic models these expenditures constitute economic waste or a 
welfare loss. 
tx tz y f y t wy x
gp g g    () ()( ) 1 .                       (2.8) 
If we set x










.                             (2.9) 
The denominator, xw y
g  , identifies national product as conventionally measured by 
national income and product accounting and the numerator indicates the output of the 
public sector, wy
g. If all leisure effects are ignored, it should be private production, x, 
rather than national product defining the appropriate welfare indicator (cf. Section 4).  
In order to derive solutions for yy
gp ,  and  x
p which could be easily incorporated into 
the government budget constraint, it is necessary to work with specific functional forms 
of the representative actor’s utility function. A frequently implicit assumption followed 
in standard macroeconomics is to rely on a so-called no-wealth effects utility function
9 
















                        (2.1a) 
The strictly concave term in leisure specifies constant relative risk aversion, a 
property which might be useful under an extended analysis covering uncertainty. The 
specific functional form has no essential bearing on our results, except that the profit 
term remains excluded from the labor market, which simplifies the analysis. Because 
the main objective of this section is to analyze a regime with an institutionally fixed real 
wage rate, the utility function remains incidental. Of course, the profit or wealth term 
could be removed from the model by restricting the private production function. This 
would, however, destroy the thread of the basic hypothesis of this section: It is        Hans G. Monissen  8 
“organized labor” which gains from a wage rate fixed at an excessively high level, 
thereby redistributing income from capital to labor.
11 
The implied solutions for the central variables are:  
yy yR t w




,                       (2.10) 
x
p twR tw t    () {[ ()} () ] 111
1
  .                     (2.11) 
Equation 2.10 reflects our no-wealth effects labor supply function.  
The decomposition of y
w from the demand side is brought about by the government 
employment decision given profit maximization by the private firms. However, the 
labor market reflects the trade-off between real consumption and leisure. If this relation 
remains excluded, the government budget constraint becomes 
tzy f y t zy f y y
gp g p g 00 1 () ()( ) ()()                        (2.12) 
and the employment level is restricted by  
Ry y
gp .                        (2.13a) 












0 .                     (2.13b) 
This leads to an interesting paper published by Ronald Findlay and John D. Wilson 
(1987) some years ago on “The Political Economy of Leviathan”, to which we owe 
some important insights. Findlay and Wilson exclude a leisure-income trade-off in their 
simple model which amounts to maximizing the production of private output. 
If the employment level is exogenously fixed, yy
ww  , a slightly more general form 
of the Findlay-Wilson model could start from 
Uu xRy
pw  (, ) . 
Overall efficiency requires maximizing x
p. Relying on the efficient allocation of the 
given working hours, the government budget constraint simplifies to 
tx t wy
g  () 1 .                           (2.8a) 
Equation 2.6 shows that the wage rate is equal to the marginal product of labor in the 
private sector. Because the labor supply, y
w, is fixed, equation 2.8a can be rewritten as 




tzy f y y t zy f y y y
gw g w w g g 00 1 () ( )( ) ()( )     .                   (2.8b) 
In equation 2.8b the tax rate is introduced as a parameter and, as a matter of 
expediency,  t
0 identifies the welfare maximizing rate. The left-hand side of equation 
2.8a has a definite maximum which may be intuitively evident from the fact that the 
size of the government may be either too small or too large for maximizing private 
production. This maximum will be reached, if equation 2.5 is met. The public 
component, z, may be restricted in such a way that a minimum private production is 
forthcoming even if the employment level in the public sector is nil. The right-hand side 
of equation 2.8b has a positive slope throughout. We assume that this slope is increasing 
over the positive domain of y
g. A difference between the left- and the right-hand side 
terms identifies government discretionary expenditures or the budget surplus. A 
negative difference, denoting a deficit, remains excluded under the structure of the 
model. A government materializing in a selfish dictator will maximize the surplus 
g x  to 
























Figure 1. The Government Budget Constraint in General Equilibrium 
 
As compared to a budget maximizing bureaucracy, the selfish dictator creates 
serious, uncontrollable welfare problems. At least in principle, Leviathan in the form of 
a budget maximizing bureaucracy could be tamed by appropriate fiscal rules (i.e. 
assigning the optimal tax rate). In this case the self-interested bureaucracy is guided by        Hans G. Monissen  10 
an invisible hand to support the welfare of society. This information is compiled in 
Figure 1.
12  
There is an important difference between our more general model and the special one 
discussed by Findlay and Wilson. If a consumption-leisure effect remains excluded, the 
government could set  t 1 and confiscate the whole of the private production. In the 
general case, there is a well defined tax rate  01   t which maximizes government 
appropriation, i.e. Keynesian government expenditures or the budget surplus. We refer 
to our numerical illustrations in Section 4 and state without proof that the general case 
can be pictured in a qualitative similar way as in their model, which is condensed in 
Figure 1. 
Some interesting results can be derived from a partial structure of our model. These 
results have immediate bearing on the interpretation of macroeconomic processes and 
provide possible interpretations both on the size and the growth of the public sector. 
The assumption is that the real wage rate is fixed at a level too high to support a 
welfare-maximizing equilibrium. There is no need to work with specific production 
functions. For the results to be derived only the usual assumption about the signs of the 
first and second derivatives are sufficient. Essential for the analysis is the fact that the 
profit share in the functional income distribution is a variable. 
zy f y w
gp ()()   , 
yyR
gp  ,            (I) 
xz yf y
gp  () ()0 , 
tx t wy x
gg   () 1 . 
A linear approximation of the system yields: 
  
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Let us assume that the changes in the time endowment, dR, and in discretionary 
expenditure, dx
g, are zero. The resulting response pattern for a change in the wage rate, 



























zy fy z y f y
g
gp g p 

   
()
[( )( ) ( ) ( ) ]

0.                   (2.16) 
      () [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ] x w yz yfy z yfy
ggp gp 0.                   (2.17) 
If the wage rate is set above the efficiency level, the marginal product of labor in the 
private sector is higher than the corresponding marginal product in the public sector: 
zf z f    . 
In this range an increase in w will reduce private production, x.
13 Because the model 
prevents the government from running a deficit and x
g remains constant, the marginal 





ty z y f y zy f y
t z yfy z yf y t w
gg p g p
gp g p
    





() [ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ]
[( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ] ( ) .
                 (2.18) 
The change in disposable labor income can be calculated from a change in the net 
wage rate, w
n, because the government guarantees “full” employment by hiring any 
excess supply of labor at the prevailing wage rate.  
wt w
n  () 1 .                           (2.19) 










  () 1                          (2.20) 
Equation 2.20 yields a rather complex expression. We follow our intuition and state 
without proof that for a range of wage rates above the efficiency level an increase in the 
gross wage rate will lead to a corresponding increase in the net wage rate, too. This is 
indeed an elaborate argument for collective wage bargaining. A weaker argument, 
however, may be sufficient: Similar to the familiar wage-push theory of inflation, 
organized labor might initiate a wage-tax spiral over time. The argument will be 
reinforced if the government is allowed to run deficits and to shift the relative tax rate 
from labor to capital. These results and the thrust of the general discussion could 
provide evidence for the hypothesis that even if the median voter or an anonymous        Hans G. Monissen  12 
group of bureaucrats does not exercise power to affect the budget, organized labor, 
possibly in tacit or implicit agreement with the incumbent bureaucracy, may be the 
decisive group, determining the size of the budget over time. 
Let us conclude this section by adding some remarks on the effects of changes in the other parameters 
of the model. An increase in R will produce higher employment levels in both sectors. These effects are 
neither equal nor proportional. The increase in private employment will produce an increase in private 
production. To finance the increased public employment level taxes must be increased. The qualitative 
information provided by the production functions, however, is not sufficient to decide in what direction 
the tax rate will change, given the endogenous increase of tax revenues provided by the higher tax base, 
x.  
Changes in discretionary government expenditures constitute pure economic waste because the level 
of private production, x, remains unaffected. Inspection of our system demonstrates that a change of x
g 
has no effect on the employment levels y
g and y
p. The crowding-out of private expenditures by public 
expenditures will be brought about by an increase in taxes induced by a higher marginal tax rate. 
The above stated results are the main implications of our simple model. An appendix included at the 
end of the paper describes alternative socio-economic arrangements derived from the basic model and 
focuses on Leviathan’s activities introduced in two variants. 
 
3. THE ECONOMIC POLICY PROBLEM FOR A BENEVOLENT 
DICTATOR 
 
Uu x x z Ry
w   (,, )( ) . 12                          (3.1) 
Utility is a function of two goods produced by the private sector, x1 and  x2 , and a 
pure public good, z, produced by the government. The component u is a strictly concave 
function. Leisure, y, as in the above model is the difference between the total time 
endowment and the time supplied for work. The budget constraint for the consumer 
reads as 
wy p x p x
w    11 22 .                           (3.2) 
The private goods are produced by a representative firm and are available at 
competitive gross prices, p1 and p2 . Nominal profits, , plus nominal 
wages, wy
w, define the income of the representative consumer. In our first model a 
proportional income tax specified the second-best tax arrangement. Given the fact that it 
is not possible to tax the time endowment, charging commodity taxes is the efficient 
























.               (3.3),  (3.4) 
Equation (3.5) specifies the productive possibilities open to the private firm. The 
variable y
p indicates the labor input used to produce the private goods. To keep the 
model as general as possible, we continue to include z as an efficiency parameter in the 
private production function. To facilitate the reconstruction of the model, the supply 
quantities are identified by asterisks:  
yy x x z
pp  (,, ) .
**
12                             (3.5) 
Equation 3.6 defines profits whereby the net sales revenue is the product of the net 
prices and the quantities sold. The specific tax rates t1 and t2 are stated in terms of the 
number of numéraire units per unit of product sold. 
    
   () () ( , , ) . pt x pt xw yx x z
p
1 11 2 22 12                       (3.6) 




























.               (3.7),  (3.8) 
The input requirement for the production of the public good which is under the 
control of the government is stated in equation 3.9: 
yy z
gg  () .                               (3.9) 
The tax revenues are used to finance the production of the public good. The 
government budget has to be balanced, a fact which prevents the government from 
generating a surplus: 
tx tx w y z Cz
g
11 22
   () () .                         (3.10) 
Market equilibrium is described by three equations, although by referring to Walras’ 
law, only two are independent: 
xx 11 
, xx 22 
, yy y
wp g  .                       (3.11) - (3.13) 
The model specifies twelve independent equations to determine twelve independent 
variables, if the nominal wage rate, w, is set equal to one and the tax rates are treated as 
policy parameters. 













12  (,, ) .                      (3.14), (3.15) 
A benevolent dictator or an enlightened social planner will maximize social welfare 
subject to the government budget constraint:
14  

















21 2 (.) (.) (.), (.),               (3.16) 
subject to        tx tx Cz 11 22 (.) (.) ( )   . 
We recall that x1 and x2 are determined by a first stage maximization process which 
allows to interpret the utility function in 3.16 as an indirect utility function. We also 
notice that the quantities in the budget restraint are replaced by using equations 3.14 and 
3.15.  
If    is introduced as an undetermined multiplier, the necessary conditions for the 
solution of the policy problem can be derived. Needless to say, the solution describes 


























































































.                        (3.19) 
Equation 3.17 reads as a modified variant of the familiar Samuelson condition for the 
optimal supply of public goods. Including z in 3.14 and 3.15 will effect the tax bases, 
which carry over to the last two terms in brackets. The multiplier  identifies the 
shadow price of the costs of producing the public good reduced by the above mentioned 
revenue effects. As illustrated by the numerical example in Section 4, this shadow price 
is greater than one. The net marginal willingness to pay is measured by the expression 
on the left side of the equation. The term in brackets on the right side adjusts the cost of 
producing the public good by the marginal net revenue induced by the increase in the 
quantities of the private goods caused by the larger quantity of the public good. The two 
other equations, 3.18 and 3.19, depict the so-called Ramsey-Boiteux conditions. 
Because an income effect is not operating in the standard demand functions for x1 and 

















































.                        (3.19a) 
Only if the two goods are unrelated, both in demand and supply, the simpler form of 
the inverse elasticity rule can be derived. 
To relate the analysis directly to Section 2 and illustrate the argument by a concrete 
numerical example, some simplifications are appropriate. Because working with two 
private goods does not provide further insights, the analysis can be simplified here, too.  
 
 
4. THE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT UNDER COMPETING POLICY 
OBJECTIVES: SOME NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
By restricting the structure of the model to only one private good which remains 















The simplified functional forms allow us to illustrate the qualitative analysis by 
working with a concrete numerical example. Given the structure of the model, the 
proportional (or flat rate) income-tax regime is equivalent to a value-added tax regime. 
The latter in turn can be derived from our commodity tax on x.
15 
Our model will now be adjusted in such a way to allow for a direct computation of 
the reduced forms without starting in a possibly nonstractable way from the first-order 
conditions and transform the problem to a second-stage maximization problem. Because 
the functional form of the utility function is maintained, the profit variable materializes 
as an additive term in an otherwise log-linear system. In the following equation 3.5a 
1will be set equal to one to keep marginal costs constant. In extension of the previous 
model the effect of z on the employment level in the private sector, y
p, is subject to 
decreasing returns, i.e. 2 is larger than 1. It should be noted that the loss of generality 
caused by the following specification is acceptable because the qualitative 
characteristics are maintained:        Hans G. Monissen  16 
Ux z R y R
w    ln ln ( ), with 3,                                                                                (3.1a) 
wy px





,                                                                                                                          (3.3a) 
yA x z
p 
 12 , with  A  008 . , 1 1  , and  2 025   . ,                                                (3.5a) 









,                           (3.7a) 
yB z
g 
 , with  B  02 .,and   5,                     (3.9a) 
ptx wBz 
.                         (3.10a) 
p1, the price of x, will be set equal to one. The wage rate, w, will be endogenously determined. As 
mentioned above, t denotes a marginal commodity tax rate (resp. a value-added tax rate). The equations 3.2a 
to 3.10a, excluding equation 3.6a, can be written as a log-linear system and then solved in a routine way. The 
endogenous variables are y
w (resp. Ry
w  ),  yy x z w
pg ,, , , a n d . The tax rate, t, operates as a parameter 
(policy instrument) to be determined by assigning alternative roles to the government. The following 







































w  1.                             (4.3) 
The remaining solutions can be derived by direct substitution into the equations of 
the system. Information and transaction costs may impose restrictions on the benevolent 
dictator, thus preventing him from pursuing a first-best optimum. Similar cost barriers 
will prevent the arrangement of a Lindahl-tax system. Financing the production of the 
public good by levying value-added taxes restrict the optimum to a second-best utility 
level, U
sb. It might be the case that the benevolent dictator must content himself with 
more conventional goals such as national product (NP), defined as xw y
g  , or national 




The above stated reduced-form equations apply only to cases of so-called non-first-
best solutions, where the representative consumer and producer are not charged the 
correct “price” for the public goods. A first-best solution or a utility maximum can be 
derived by maximizing utility subject to the resource constraints. The formal 
computation of a Lindahl equilibrium could follow the rules derived in the Appendix to 
Section 3. However, given the specification of the model, this equilibrium creates 
problems of interpretation: Introducing a competitive market for the public good will 
turn the private production function into one with increasing returns. This implies losses 
for the private firms. The public sector will earn profits. The sum of these two items 
which is positive should be included in the private sector’s budget constraint. 
To derive the second-best solutions, we proceed as follows: Given the definition of 
the policy goal under discussion, the reduced-form solutions in terms of the tax rate are 
substituted for the respective variables. Setting the first derivative equal to 0 allows 
solving for the respective tax rate and the policy variables involved. 
The first three second-best policy alternatives should be evaluated against the ideal norm of the first-best 
solution or the Lindahl equilibrium. The solution values for these competing arrangements are stated in Table 
1. The numbers in brackets describe the case in which the productive effect of the public good remains 
excluded and only the utility effect is operating. The results of the simulations confirm what should be 
expected from a priori-reasoning: Social welfare or utility, U, is highest under the first-best or Lindahl 
solution. Maximizing NI instead of focussing on NP will reduce welfare. It may be surprising and may run 
counter to intuition that the level of employment distributed over the two sectors remains constant under all 
three second-best solutions. This result is the consequence of the specific form of the utility function and the 
fact that a profit term in the private sector budget constraint does not become operative. The employment level 
will be higher in the Lindahl equilibrium, which is equivalent to the first-best utility solution, because the 
privatization of the market for public goods generates profits as described above. Under the first-best utility 
solution the scarcity prices of the public good both for the consumers and the firms are implicitly included. 
Given the constant level of employment under second-best solutions, the interesting aspect of the numbers in 
Table 1 is the distribution of employment and production over the two sectors. The higher welfare under the 
NP-goal as compared to the NI-goal is associated with a larger public sector, measured either by tax revenues, 
public good production or public sector employment. Maximizing national income directs production from the 
public good to the private good. Maximizing second-best utility, U
sb, will reinforce this mechanism if 
compared to the NP-goal. Finally, a very important result should be noted: If the policies of the benevolent 
dictator approach the first best solution, the optimal and efficient size of the government will increase.
16 
However, to assess the consequences of the model appropriately, it should be made clear that the government 
materializes here in the role of a benevolent dictator and not in a Leviathan who will be analyzed in Section 5.        Hans G. Monissen  18 
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Table 1. Efficient Size of Government under Competing Goals 
 
Once more, our model incorporates a productive government should be contrasted 
with the standard macroeconomic model in which the government has no useful role to 
play. At least under full employment, the welfare-maximizing size of the government is 
simply zero. 
The reduced-form equation 4.1 specifies a Laffer-type curve for x. As shown in 
Table 1, this curve has a regular maximum at the tax rate  05 . 0  t  (see row for NI in 
Table 1). A government maximizing tax revenues will operate on the Laffer curve—in 
the usual denotation—and thereby, as a typical monopolist, fix a tax rate in the falling 
range of the reduced-form equation for x. Under the specified parameter constellation, 
tax revenues are: 
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The first-order condition, 
dt x
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5. GOVERNMENT AS LEVIATHAN 
 
The benevolent (and efficient) dictator is the implicit role model of the more 
orthodox public finance literature. The results derived from such a model are not 
different from an extreme variant of a public choice model where an enlightened 
median voter is able to fully constrain the political process from the demand side. As in 
Section 2, it makes sense to contrast this case with a Leviathan government. Leviathan 
may either materialize as a surplus-maximizing dictator or a budget-maximizing 
anonymous bureaucracy. In this final section we concentrate only on this second 
variant. 
It should be noted that the typical model of the literature, incorporating a revenue-
maximizing politician-bureaucrat with standard reference to Niskanen (1968 and 
1971)
17, remains incomplete as long as it ignores the productive activities provided by 
the government. In order to prevent a so-called worst case scenario leading to a 
complete confiscation of private production, the familiar consumption-leisure trade-off 
will be retained. Including a production function for the public good in connection with 
the revenue-maximizing hypothesis reveals some surprising results for efficiency. The 
politician-bureaucrat, at least in a technical sense, is forced to be efficient in order to 
maximize tax revenues.  
To illustrate the results, the standard microeconomic technique contrasting 
indifference relations with underlying restrictions can be used. A graphic analysis 
allows us to separate the behavior of a Leviathan bureaucracy from that of the 
benevolent dictator.  
For the consumer-voter both the tax rate and the quantity of the public good are 






 ()                              (5.1), [(3.1a)] 
Substituting from equation 4.1 and 4.2 and applying equation 4.3 to simplify the 
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The marginal rate of substitution in t-z-space has a positive slope because the tax rate 









0  . 
Both in Figures 2 and 3 three typical indifference curves are presented. For the 
moment the set of indifference curves, UU U
gg g
01 2 ,a n d, which will be discussed in a 
moment, should be ignored. 
The efficiency line or restriction depicting the maximum level of the public good for 
any given tax rate is identical with the reduced form equation 4.2 for z. The efficiency 
line has a positive slope throughout, due to the fact that the demand function for x has 
unitary elasticity: 
t z  02
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Figure 2. The Second-Best Optimum 
 
The efficiency line is depicted both in Figures 2 and 3. The standard microeconomic 
problem can be solved in a routine way. Figure 2 illustrates the optimization problem 
for a benevolent dictator with the implicit second-best solution for utility. The solution 
values,  z 1 and t  02 . , reproduce the second-best solution for utility, U
sb, shown in 
Table 1. 
Our simple hypothesis for the politician-bureaucrat is that he strives to maximize tax 
revenues:  
Ut x
g  .                                                         (5.3) 












As shown in the last section—see equation 4.4—maximizing tax revenues results in 
a tax rate that is much higher than the one maximizing the Laffer curve for x. The 
quantity of the public good, z, associated with the revenue-maximizing tax rate t  051 .  is 
1.21.        Hans G. Monissen  22 
This solution could, of course, be derived by using standard indifference curves to be 











The substitution procedure parallels the one described above. Without further 
discussion we graph the government’s indifference curves shown in Figure 3. It 
certainly does not come as a surprise that the size of government under this hypothesis 










In the preceding discussion we have tried to reconcile the neoclassical approach of 
optimal tax theory with a simple public choice model. The analytical basis for this 
attempt was provided by a general equilibrium model with a public good produced by 




sector. The public good is financed by levying optimal second-best taxes given the fact 
that the prevailing institutional arrangement prevents a first-best solution.  
In Section 2, a simple choice-theoretical model was presented in which the public 
good operates only as a productive factor via the infrastructure thereby enhancing the 
productivity of the private sector. The income tax system operates as a flat income tax. 
Given the optimal tax rate, the appropriate rule for a welfare maximizing dictator is to 
balance the budget. The same unintended social consequences are brought about by a 
budget-maximizing bureaucracy constrained by the same optimal income tax rate. The 
basic model proved especially useful in the modeling of alternative social arrangements: 
e.g., if organized labor succeeds in fixing the real wage rate over the efficiency level, 
the marginal productivity in the private sector will increase both because the level of 
private employment will decrease and the level of public employment will increase. As 
the government is forced to pay competitive wages, this collective action leads to a 
redistribution of income from capital to labor, thereby increasing the size of the 
government. It should be emphasized that the model of a productive government could 
be reformulated without analytical difficulties to extend or to replace the typical 
Keynesian perspective of the standard macroeconomic models. Leviathan played either 
the role of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat or a surplus-maximizing selfish dictator.  
In Section 3 the economic problem for a benevolent dictator was discussed from the 
perspective of the theory of optimal taxation. Because several private goods were 
included, the second-best tax system is one of distinct commodity taxes. If only one 
private good is available, a commodity-tax system can be easily transformed into a 
value-added tax system which under the structure of the model is equivalent to a 
proportional income tax system. This more technical discussion was used to derive 
some useful first-best conditions which are important for the institutionalization of a 
demand-revealing process or possible Lindahl-tax prices.  
The main part of Section 3 was the analysis of alternative government arrangements 
based on a concrete numerical example where the public good operated both through 
the utility function of the representative agent and the production function of the private 
sector. The pattern of production and employment under alternative governmental goals 
was derived for a benevolent dictator. The “first-best” or Lindahl solution thereby 
supplied the reference situation against which competing goals such as aggregate        Hans G. Monissen  24 
consumer surplus, national product or national income could be evaluated. Rather 
surprisingly, the size of the government increased with government efforts to maximize 
welfare by establishing a more efficient tax rate. Subsequently, the behavior of an 
optimizing politician-bureaucrat was modeled according to a Leviathan perspective, 
whereby the relevant structural restrictions were consistently derived and not postulated 
in an ad hoc fashion. The excessive size of government in this case did not come as a 
surprise. A graphic illustration helped to elucidate the analysis and summarize the major 
results.  
The deplorable fact of excessive (inefficient measured against optimal “social 
welfare”) government size along an explosive growth path for almost all Western 
countries would certainly suggest the need for fiscal reforms on a constitutional level. 
Constitutional limitations upon government taxing activities as proposed by Buchanan 
and Brennan are without doubt a most effective recipe for taming Leviathan. A serious 
objection, of course, remains because pulling away the government from the Leviathan 
equilibrium is no guarantee that the new equilibrium is preferable from an overall 
welfare point of view. Further understanding of the welfare reducing effects of a 
Leviathan government presupposes opening the “black box” called government and 
analyzing its internal structure and organization.
18 This procedure, however, remains 
basically a partial one with the difficulties holding the strings together under a general 
equilibrium perspective. The main theoretical avenue seems to be clear: Fiscal reforms 
should start from an economic model of the behavior of the politician-bureaucrat, 
whereby modern microeconomics could provide the technical details for an efficiently 
designed contract mechanism. Such a mechanism, together with the specification of the 
proper role of the government in a market economy, could provide efficient incentives 
for the political actor to redirect his behavior toward a “first-best” solution. 
 
 
Appendix to Section 2: Some Variations of the Basic Model 
 
Model II restates a second-best utility solution excluding the consumption-leisure 
trade-off of the general model: 
zy f y w
gp ()()   0, 
yyR




zy f y z y f y
gp g p ()() () ()     0, 
xz y fy
gp  () ()0 , 
tx t wy x
gg   () 1 . 
The endogenous variables are yyx w
gp ,, , ,  and  t.  
If a consumption-leisure trade-off is included, the economic process is described by 
model III: 
zy f y w
gp ()()   0, 
yy t w R
gp  

[( ) ] 1
1
 ,                          (III) 
xz y fy
gp  () ()0 , 
tx t wy x
gg   () 1 . 
The endogenous variables are yyx
gp ,, , and w.  Including our efficiency condition 
will endogenize t. It is possible to include the utility function as a second-best welfare 
function, too. This procedure constitutes the subject matter of Section 4 and 5. 
Model IV and model V could be used to analyze Leviathan in either of two roles: A 
specific dictator will maximize  x
g 19, and an anonymous group of bureaucrats aims at 
maximizing the size of the budget. If the Leviathan of model V uses the tax rate as an 
instrument the government, as a monopolist, will operate in the declining range of a 
curve relating x to t (see Section 4). Model IV reads as: 
zy f y w
gp ()()   0, 
yy t w R
gp  

[( ) ] 1
1
 ,        (IV) 
xz y fy
gp  () ()0 , 
tx t wy x
gg    () 10 . 
The endogenous variables are yx w
p,,, and x
p. Including the efficiency condition 
from equation 2.5, once more, will endogenize t. 
zy f y w
gp ()()   0, 
yyR
gp  ,            (V) 
xz y fy
gp  () ()0 ,        Hans G. Monissen  26 
tx t wy
g   () 10 , 
T tx  0. 
The endogenous variables are yyx w
gp ,, , , and T. 
 
 
Appendix to Section 3: Some General Welfare Remarks 
 
Given the case of one private good, x, and one public good, z, an omniscient 
benevolent dictator would maximize social welfare or aggregate consumer surplus 
which is much simplified by the fact that only one representative consumer is included: 
 Max U uxz R y xz y z
pg    (,) (,) () .  





















































The personalized prices pz
c and pz
f  denote the marginal willingness to pay of 
consumers and firms respectively. These equations can be rearranged to yield the 
familiar Lindahl conditions which are nothing more than another expression for the 




















The Lindahl equilibrium thus selects the first-best optimum. 
Our abstract analysis has direct bearing on a number of interesting policy 
applications among which the demand-revealing scheme seems to be the most 
important. Demand-revelation could overcome the incentive problem inherent in the 
Lindahl-tax scheme. Tullock (together with Nicolas Tidemann) not only coined the term 
“rent-seeking” but he himself contributed to the theoretical development of this theory 
(e.g. Tidemann and Tullock, [1976]).  
 
 








* The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments and suggestions by Price Fishback, Günter 
Krause, Stephan Monissen and the participants of the conference. Of course, any remaining errors and 
omissions are those of the author. 
1 The 5th Edition from 1989 was revised 1994 and retitled. The 5th Edition was reissued 1994 as The 
New World of Economics. Gordon Tullock’s public choice perspective is included in a later book which 
unfortunately did not receive the commercial influence it deserved: Gordon Tullock and Richard B. 
McKenzie (1978). “On the Trail of Homo Economicus” is the apt title of a collection of Gordon 
Tullock’s unpublished papers edited by Gordon L. Brady and Robert D. Tollison (1994).  
2 In a recent paper James Gwartney, Randall Holcombe and Robert Lawson present an empirical 
assessment of Adam Smith’s core functions of government (1998). 
3 As a general reference to the modern theory of optimal taxation see Alan J. Auerbach, (1985). 
4 This analytical variant is a useful extension of the standard positive-normative spectrum, cf. here 
James M. Buchanan, (1998). 
5 The structure of the model builds on Hans G. Monissen, (1985). His model incorporates a monetary 
sector, an extension which has no consequence for the problems under discussion here. 
6 See John S. Chipman for a detailed discussion of this point (1965). 
7 The specific circumstances under which a voting process with heterogeneous actors will generate a 
Pareto-optimal provision of a public good are no more restrictive than those under which the 
representative actor operates in modern economic theory. A standard reference in this context is an early 
paper by Howard R. Bowen from 1943. 
8 The model is set up in such a way that it allows approximately a sequential solution. 
9 For a lucid discussion in the context of macroeconomic theory see Stephen McCafferty (1990). 
10 A more general treatment is given by Hans G. Monissen (1996). 
11 Theories trying to explain the size of government and its development over time are mushrooming. 
A recent popular thesis is that the openness of an economy is a critical factor. An open economy is 
exposed to external risk necessitating the insurance role of the government; cf. here Dani Rodrik (1998) 
or Alberto Alesina and Romain Wacziarg (1997). 
12 Our figure corresponds to their Figure 8.2 on page 294. 
13 The marginal product in the private sector which determines gross compensation of labor in the 
public sector is higher than the marginal product of z. If the efficiency condition is fulfilled, the change in 
x is zero depicting the maximum value for x. 
14 The general argument presented here is based on the technical analysis in Claude Henry (1989). 
15 Value-added taxes are levied ad valorem which changes the Ramsey-Boiteux condition. Tax revenues 
are now tpx, where t is the value-added tax rate. The Ramsey-Boiteux condition has now to be extracted from 




















   () .  
16 This interesting observation should be related to the empirical findings published in a recent paper by 
Gary S. Becker and Casey B. Mulligan (1998). But we should note that Becker and Mulligan start from a 
somewhat different perspective. 
17 It should be noted that Niskanen explicitly acknowledges here the “powerful insight” provided by 
Gordon Tullock (1968, p. 294).  
18 In this context it is impossible to summarize Tullock’s guiding contributions to this problem over 
several decades. A representative reference is here Gordon Tullock  (1992). The same problems are at 
present on the agenda of modern contract theorists, see for instance Jean Tirole (1982). 
19 It is here where Tullock’s work on rent-seeking could be usefully integrated. The seminal 
contribution is Tullock’s paper from 1967. For an effort to integrate rent-seeking into a general 
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